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Achieving Internet access “anywhere, anytime” is an ideal that much research has been working
towards. One aspect of this research is the integration o different network technologies such as
wireless local area network (WLAN) technologies and third generation (3G) technologies into so-
called heterogeneous networks. With such integration, an important issue is handling mobility
both within a given network technology and among the various ones. Mobile IP is a standard
that supports transparent mobility at the network layer. However, another issue that arises is
authentication and authorisation of users. The Mobile IP standard does not adequately address
this issue. Proposals for improved authentication architectures for Mobile IP have therefore been
made. This document describes the implementation of an authentication architecture prototype
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Mobile computing is expected to increase in popularity. Indeed, currently, the usage and spread
of wireless local area networks (WLANs) is on the increase. The IEEE 802.11 standard (com-
monly referred to as WiFi) is the dominant standard for WLANs. WLAN hotspots continue to
be deployed in locations such as cafes, airports, libraries, and so on. Mobile computing hinges on
wireless access to the Internet. The desire among mobile computing users is the provision of such
access “anywhere, anytime”. However, WLANs cannot, by definition, satisfy this need on their
own. Because of the limited coverage they offer, something more is required.
3G technologies such as CDMA2000 and UMTS, on the other hand, provide wide coverage.
But they, on their own, are not a panacea either. 3G networks typically provide significantly lower
data rates than WLANs. For this reason, an active area of research is heterogeneous networks.
(Such networks are also referred to as integrated or 4G networks.) Heterogeneous networks consist
of more than one access technology. This allows for the provision of the best of both worlds. For
instance, a 3G technology could be combined with a WLAN technology. In such a situation, if a
mobile station is within range of a WLAN and the signal is sufficiently strong, then that is the
preferred technology as higher data rates are supported. When the WLAN signal strength falls
below a threshold, then the mobile station switches to the 3G network.[3]
There are a variety of issues to be resolved in integrating networks. With the illustration given,
an immediately evident issue is that of handoff. A mobile station needs to be able to determine
when to switch from one network technology to another. Such handoffs are referred to as vertical
handoffs. (Horizontal handoffs on the other hand, involve moving between cells within the same
network technology. In a WLAN, for instance, this would involve moving from within the range
of one access point to the range of another access point.) In addition, it is undesirable to have the
station continually switching from one network technology to the next. This could happen, for
example, when the WLAN signal strength fluctuates close to the threshold. Without some sort of
control, the station would flap constantly between the WLAN and the 3G network. It is desirable
then, to have some sort of hysteresis implemented so that switching between network technologies
is controlled.
The issue of handoff described above is one of mobility management. Another question in mo-
bility management regards the layer at which network mobility should be provided in the context
of heterogeneous networks. Mobility can be provided at various layers of the TCP/IP reference
model such as the network, transport and application layers. For instance, Mobile IP, the mobility
protocol relevant to this project, is a network layer solution to mobility. Determining which layer
is best suited to providing mobility has been debated with differing viewpoints given. Banerjee et
al [2] suggest the application layer as being the best choice while Eddy [10] suggests the tranport
layer as “the strongest candidate”. Any choice has tradeoffs associated with it because mobility
is a “feature with no well defined place in classical protocol stacks.” [10]
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A few of the other issues to be addressed in heterogeneous networks are quality of service,
profile handling, and AAA support. A more detailed discussion of the issues surrounding hetero-
geneous networks can be found in [12] and [15].
The aim of this project is to extend Dynamics HUT Mobile IP, an open-source implementation
of the Mobile IPv4 protocol. This implementation was carried out at the Helsinki University of
Technology. The purpose of the extension is to provide the AAA functionality that is lacking in
the current implementation. The motivation for this is that such functionality would be available
in open-source. The Mobile IP protocol, AAA infrastructure and the combination of Mobile IP
and AAA will be discussed in the “Background” chapter.
The rest of the document is structured as follows. The following chapter presents the back-
ground for this project. Specifically, it outlines Mobile IP, AAA infrastructure, and the rationale
for combining Mobile IP and AAA. Related work is also presented. The subsequent chapter de-
scribes in detail, the work carried out in this project. The design of the extensions proposed and
the extent of the implementation are presented. The chapter that then follows presents the results
of the implementation. These results are presented in the form of output from the implementation
to show how the implementation actually works. The final chapter gives an appraisal of the extent
of the implementation in this project. In addition, it offers suggestions on further work that could





Mobile IP is a network layer solution to the problem of mobility. It essentially solves the problem
of mobility via the use of two IP addresses: a home address and a care-of address. TCP, the most
commonly used protocol at the transport layer, makes use of a 4-tuple for its connections:
<source IP address, source port, destination IP address, destination port>
If any one of these changes, an existing connection will be broken. The rationale behind the
operation of Mobile IP is preventing this from happening. In particular, it ensures that the IP
addresses do not change.
2.1.1 Mobile IPv4 Operation
Mobile IPv4 consists of three functional entities:
• the mobile node
• the home agent
• the foreign agent
These are shown in Figure 2.1.
A mobile node possesses a static home address and a dynamic care-of address. The home
address is associated with the mobile node’s home network. The home address is used to give the
illusion of the mobile node being in its home network. The care-of address, on the other hand,
changes with the mobile node’s point of attachment. The care-of address allows the mobile node
to continue to receive packets addressed to it even when it is not connected to its home network.
A care-of address may either be a foreign agent one or a colocated one. A foreign agent care-of
address is an IP address of a foreign agent. A colocated care-of address, on the other hand, is an
IP address temporarily assigned to one of the interfaces of the mobile node.
The operation of Mobile IP can be divided into three mechanisms [24], namely:
• Discovering the care-of address
• Registering the care-of address
• Tunnelling to the care-of address
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Figure 2.1: Mobile IP registration process. FA is the foreign agent, HA is the home agent, and
MN is the mobile node.
Discovery: When a mobile node attaches itself to a foreign network, it needs to discover a
care-of address. The mobile node typically determines the care-of address from agent advertise-
ments, which contain information about care-of addresses. Agent advertisements are an extension
to standard router advertisements. Foreign agents (and home agents) typically broadcast agent
advertisements at regular intervals. A mobile node may, however, broadcast a solicitation that
will be answered by any foreign agent or home agent that receives it.
Registration: Once a mobile node has a care-of address, it informs its home agent of the fact.
This is necessary for the home agent to determine where to route packets addressed to the mobile
node. This process is called registering to the home agent. The mobile node sends (usually via the
foreign agent) a registration request to its home agent. If the home agent approves the request, it
updates itself with the information provided in the request and sends a reply to the mobile node.
The sequence of Mobile IP registration operations is shown in Figure 2.1.
Tunnelling: The home agent redirects packets from the home network to the care-of address
provided by the mobile node. This redirection is done via tunnelling. Tunnelling is done by
encapsulating a packet addressed to the home network within a new header addressed to the care-
of address. The packet can thus be routed to the location of the mobile node in a foreign network.
Once at the foreign network, the packet is then stripped of the new header so that it appears to
have the mobile node’s home address as the destination IP address. It is in this original form that
the packet is presented to higher level protocols such as TCP. In the case of a foreign agent care-of
address, a tunnel from a home agent terminates at the foreign agent. However, with a colocated
care-of address, the tunnel terminates at an interface on the mobile node.
2.2 AAA
AAA stands for Authentication, Authorisation and Accounting. The AAA model provides a
framework for these three aspects of access control. The need for the AAA architecture is borne
out of a need for scalability. Without AAA, managing the wide variety of network equipment
and the associated authentication methods would be difficult. The following questions mimic the
operation of the framework [13]:
• Who are you?
• What services am I allowed to give you?
• What did you do with my services while you were using them?
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Authentication
Authentication is the process of verifying the credentials of an entity. This requires that a given
entity possesses unique credentials that allow for unambiguous identification. Examples of such
credentials include the combination of a user ID and password, digital certificates, and so on.
Authentication is carried out prior to granting access to resources.
Authorisation
Authorisation is the process of determining the resources a given entity is permitted to access
and granting access to these resources. Authentication and authorisation are typically carried out
simultaneously in an environment managed by AAA.
Accounting
Accounting refers to the methodology for collecting information on resource usage. This could
be necessary for a variety of reasons including billing, auditing, trend analysis, capacity-planning,
and so on.
2.2.1 AAA Applied
The AAA model is application-neutral. As a result implementations of AAA architecture can vary
in complexity as dictated by specific needs. The model is based on a client-server model. An AAA
server maintains a database of authentication and authorisation information on users. An AAA
client, on the other hand, resides on a network component such as a network access server.[19]
The AAA server and client communicate to provide users with distributed AAA services.
A good example of where AAA infrastructure could be useful is the case of Internet Service
Providers (ISPs). An ISP needs to be able to determine the identity of users of its network re-
sources. It also has to be able to determine what resources a given user is allowed to access.
For instance, one user on a “low-cost” plan may get limited bandwidth while another user on a
“higher” plan may be offered more bandwidth. Very closely tied to this is collecting information
on resource usage. Using the example of the two users, beyond just knowing how much band-
width has been allocated to each, it may also be important to know such things as the duration
of the connection or the amount of data transferred. These details may then be neccessary for
billing purposes. For instance, a user who exceeds the allocated data transfer limit may need to
be charged extra. This example requires the existence of some sort of policy. AAA provides a
unified framework for the implementation of such a policy.
RADIUS (Remote Access Dial-In User Service) [30] is the most widely used AAA protocol.[19]
It was actually designed prior to the notion of AAA as a framework. Despite this, it satisfies most
of the requirements of AAA. RADIUS was originally designed to support dialup connections. Its
current usage, though, is more varied. RADIUS is a client-server protocol. A user connects to a
NAS – on which a RADIUS client resides – seeking network access. The RADIUS client forwards
the user’s identification data to a RADIUS server. The RADIUS server then replies to the NAS
accepting or rejecting the user’s connection request. In the case of acceptance, the RADIUS server
informs the NAS of the services that a user is authorised to receive. Communication between a
RADIUS client and a RADIUS server is protected by means of a shared secret used to authenticate
messages exchanged between the entities. RADIUS uses UDP for its protocol packets. RADIUS
does have shortcomings as an AAA protocol, particularly in the wake of mobility. These shortcom-
ings include the limitation on the size of attribute values, the lack of well-defined fault tolerance
mechanisms, and the lack of end-to-end security.
The Diameter protocol [5] has been developed to address the shortcomings of RADIUS. Its
development reflects the growth in the number of Internet users, access technologies, and network
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Figure 2.2: The basic model
access servers (which, in turn, have also grown in complexity). In addition, there is a need for
the ability to handle network access across administrative domains as well as roaming. These
changes in the Internet place new demands on AAA protocols. [5] Diameter, unlike RADIUS, is a
peer-to-peer protocol. The improvements in Diameter over RADIUS include better fault tolerance,
better security features, reliable transport (via the use of TCP or the Stream Control Transmission
Protocol (SCTP) rather than UDP), server-initiated message support (useful, for instance, if a
server would like to request the termination of a connection), and support for roaming.
2.3 Integrating Mobile IP and AAA
The design of Mobile IP “allowed for, but did not [include], verification protocols to check the
mobile node’s identity in the absence of a preconfigured security association.”[25] In other words,
the standard operation of Mobile IP assumes security associations between the mobile node and
foreign agent (MN-FA), the foreign agent and home agent (FA-HA), and the mobile node and
home agent (MN-FA). However, in the interests of facilitating connectivity anywhere, it is reason-
able to imagine a mobile node attempting to gain access in an administrative domain other than
that of its home network. RFC 2977 [11] describes requirements for integrating Mobile IP and
AAA functionality. This project is based on the requirements outlined in the RFC.
The basic model is shown in Figure 2.2. When a client (the mobile node) is in a foreign
domain, it typically needs to request resources provided by the domain. To do this, the client
presents its credentials to an attendant (which in Mobile IP would be the foreign agent). The
attendant, however, may not have enough information to verify the client’s credentials. The at-
tendant therefore forwards the credentials on to the local authority (AAAL). The local authority
too may have insufficient information to verify the client’s credentials. It is, however, able to con-
tact an external authority to verify the client’s credentials. This external authority is the home
authority (AAAH) of the client. The local authority’s role is therefore to first obtain authori-
sation from an external authority and then notify the attendant of this. Once the attendant is
informed that a given client is authorised, it grants the client access to services that it is entitled to.
The requirements outlined above implicitly assume a security model. First, there needs to be
a security association between the mobile node and home authority. This represents a significant
difference from the original definition of Mobile IP, which requires a security association between
the mobile node and the home agent. The home agent is, however, a routing agent rather than
an authentication agent. Secondly, it is assumed that there is a security association between the
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Figure 2.3: The extended model with a broker.
attendant (foreign agent) and the local authority. This is necessary because the foreign agent
needs to be able to trust the local authority’s role in verifying credentials. Thirdly, there needs to
be a security association between the local authority and the home authority. Finally, there needs
to be a security association between the home authority and the home agent. It should be noted
that in this security model there is only one security association maintained by the mobile node.
This is desirable to limit the amount of configuring necessary within the mobile node.
The means to identify a mobile node suggested by the RFC is the Network Access Identifer
[4], an identifier of the form user@realm. This is to be used for mobile nodes that do not already
have an IP address. The advantage of using this form of an identifier is that the home domain,
realm, can be easily determined by a local authority.
One problem with the AAA model as described here is that of scalability. With this arrange-
ment, every local authority (and, by extension, foreign domain) would need to establish security
associations with every home authority that a mobile node could possibly have a security asso-
ciation with. To solve this problem, RFC 2977 suggests using a brokered model (see Figure 2.3)
as an extension to the basic model described here. A broker (AAAB), in this model, would es-
tablish security associations with as many administrative domains as possible. This way, a local
authority would ideally need to have a security association with only one broker. The broker, on
the other hand, acts as an intermediary for passing AAA data between local and home authorities.
Wireless network operators need to be able to charge for the services they offer. The original
design of Mobile IP was geared towards developing an enabling technology for transparent mobility.
The notion of billing was not part of this design. AAA offers this notion. In essence, with the
combination of the Mobile IP and AAA, a business case for providing Internet access using Mobile
IP can be made.
2.4 Related work
2.4.1 Previous Research
There are several proposals in the literature on authentication and mobility. Wang et al [37]
describe an “authentication architecture for fast authentication during inter-networking handoff
and large-scale heterogeneous networks.” Cappiello et al [6] also make proposals in a similar vein.
Yang et al [38] suggest simultaneously using a public-key cryptosystem and a symmetric key cryp-
tosystem to carry out secure Mobile IP registration.
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Table 2.1: Mobile IP implementations
Name IP Version Operating System License
Monarch 4 FreeBSD BSD Style
Secure Mobile Net 4 FreeBSD BSD Style
Dynamics 4 Linux GPLv2
Secgo Mobile IP 4 Linux/Windows Commercial
MosquitoNet 4 Linux GPL?
Birdstep 4 Windows Commercial
Ecutel 4 Windows Commercial
SHISA 6 FreeBSD BSD Style
INRIA HMIPv6 6 FreeBSD BSD Style
Lancaster MIPv6 6 Linux ?
MIPL 6 Linux GPL
What appears to be lacking, however, is implementations that are compliant with RFC 2977.
This project aims to lead towards addressing this.
2.4.2 Mobile IP Implementations
There are several implementations of Mobile IP both commercial and free. There are implementa-
tions available for both Mobile IPv4 and Mobile IPv6. A brief comparison of some of the features
in the various implementations is presented in Table 2.1.
Most of the available free implementations of Mobile IPv4 in particular have not been actively
updated recently. This can probably be explained by the fact that there are several commercial
implementations of Mobile IPv4 available, which suggests maturity among Mobile IPv4 imple-
mentations. Among the free Mobile IPv4 implementations available for Linux, Dynamics is the
most complete one. It has been shown to be a stable version and appears to be favoured amongst




This chapter describes the design and implementation of the project. Firstly, an overview that
motivates the specific aims of the project is given. The next section then provides the design of the
implementation followed by a section that outlines the steps of the implementation. Subsequent
sections detail these implementation steps.
3.1 Overview
As discussed in the background chapter, RFC 2977 [11] details the requirements for integrating
Mobile IP and AAA. According to the RFC, the only security association a mobile node is required
to maintain is between itself and the home authority (that is, the home AAA server). Using this
security association, it is possible to derive a security association between the mobile node and its
home agent, as well as another between the mobile node and a foreign agent as required for the
standard operation of Mobile IP. RFC 2977 does not, however, specify how this derivation can be
done. This role is fulfilled by RFC 3957 [23], which describes AAA registration keys for Mobile
IPv4. More specifically, RFC 3957 details “extensions to Mobile IP registration messages that can
be used to create Mobility Security Associations between the mobile node and its home agent,
and/or between the mobile node and a foreign agent.”
It is useful to further distinguish the two RFCs referred to in the previous paragraph. RFC
2977 is concerned with describing interactions between Mobile IP and AAA. Through this inter-
action, it becomes possible for AAA servers to authenticate and authorise network access requests
from mobile nodes. In Mobile IP, registration requests are used to request network access. To
comply with RFC 2977, Mobile IP agents need extra functionality to translate between the Mobile
IP registration messages and AAA messages. RFC 3957, therefore, describes the format of exten-
sions to Mobile IP registration messages to incorporate the information required for interacting
with AAA servers.
In terms of compliance to RFCs, extending the functionality of Mobile IP entities to handle
registration messages with the extensions specified in RFC 3957 may be considered a necessary
condition for fulfilling the requirements of RFC 2977. Implementing such functionality is to a
large extent the focus of this project. The aim of the project was to extend a freely available
implementation of Mobile IP, such that it would be able to properly handle registration requests
with AAA extensions and make use of the keys generated from these requests. An additional
requirement, to comply with RFC 2977, is carrying out all needed AAA and Mobile IP functions
for an initial registration message within a single Internet traversal.
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Figure 3.1: Simplified representation of Dynamics implementation.
Figure 3.2: Design of the project implementation
3.2 Implementation Design
The design of Dynamics Mobile IP is modelled on the functional entities defined by the Mobile IP
standard. From an operational perspective, the starting points of Dynamics implementation are
the source files, mn.c (for the mobile node), fa.c (for the foreign agent) and ha.c (for the home
agent). This setup is shown in Figure 3.1. These files are referred to here as “starting points”
because there are several other files associated with each of them. In the case of the foreign agent,
for instance, functions to handle requests are defined in the source file fa_request.c. Therefore,
the functionality in these three files basically coordinates the behaviour of the given entity.
The design of the project implementation is modelled directly on the basic model of the au-
thentication architecture described in RFC 2977 (see Figure 2.2). The design for this project is
shown in Figure 3.2. As can be seen in the figure, the source files fa_aaa.c and ha_aaa.c are in-
tended to provide the functionality for the local authority and home authority, respectively, of the
combined Mobile IP and AAA authentication architecture. The project implementation has been
designed to be as cleanly separated as possible from the existing Dynamics implementation. The
primary advantage of this is limiting the changes to the existing implementation. On the other
hand, the main disadvantage of the decision is duplication of some of the functionality provided
in Dynamics. In a fully functional implementation, fa_aaa.c and ha_aaa.c would interact with
AAA servers. However, this project was intended to be a proof-of-concept. Therefore, interaction
with AAA servers is considered to be outside the project’s scope.
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3.3 Implementation Outline
Choosing C as the programming language for the implementation, provided the most straightfor-
ward approach to integrating the extension implemented in this project with the original imple-
mentation of Dynamics. The Dynamics software was implemented in C. The steps carried out in
the implementation were as follows:
• Walking through the code to become familiar with the Dynamics HUT Mobile IP implemen-
tation.
• Setting up an initial testbed to run the software. This testbed would then form the basis for
running the functionality implemented in this project.
• Building an independent AAA prototype to test and implement the AAA functionality
independently of the Dynamics implementation.
• Finally, incorporating the functionality of the AAA prototype built in the previous step into
the Dynamics implementation.
These steps are described in detail in the sections that follow.
3.4 Code Walkthrough
The first step towards implementation was becoming familiar with the source code. This essentially
involved walking through the code. Despite the absence of a document that describes the structure
of the Dynamics implementation, the code is well structured with descriptive comments for most
functions. The initial focus of the walkthroughs was the operational aspects of the foreign agent
(fa.c and associated files) and home agent (ha.c and associated files) particularly with regard
to handling registration requests. The reason for this was to determine where to intercept a
request using AAA extensions that would otherwise be rejected by the foreign agent and home
agent programs. The walkthroughs were useful in getting a feel for the design of the Dynamics
implementation. However, using these alone it proved challenging to establish exactly how the
programs worked.
3.5 Initial Testbed Setup
The next step therefore, was setting up a testbed to run the Dynamics software in debug mode
using the following command:
<daemon> --fg --debug
where <daemon> is dynfad (for the foreign agent), dynhad (for the home agent) or dynmnd (for
the mobile node) as required. In debug mode, the programs give detailed output on the state of
the program. Often, it is possible to determine which function has produced a given line of output
because the function name is given as well. However, even when this is not the case, it is a simple
matter to search the source code to find the function that produced the output. This proved very
useful for the overall implementation process.
It was also necessary to determine how much AAA functionality had been implemented. Ac-
cording to the documentation that covers the Dynamics implementation’s conformance to RFCs,
AAA functionality had been fully implemented in the mobile node and only partially implemented
in the foreign agent and home agent. Carrying out this exercise involved manipulating the config-
uration file of the mobile node to see how both the foreign agent and home agent handled various
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configurations.
The AAA functionality of the mobile node needed to be tested too. Usefully, a program to do
this is included in the Dynamics package. The program, aaasimul, acts as a foreign agent and
simulates the functionality of a home agent and the AAA infrastructure. The Dynamics package
contains functions in auth.c to handle AAA key generation. When aaasimul receives a request
from a mobile node, it makes use of these routines to generate the MN-HA and MN-FA keys.
The program then sends a simulated registration accepted reply to the mobile node. As a result,
aaasimul demonstrates what is involved in generating both keys via AAA extensions and the
replies. When this is combined with the requests with AAA extensions from the mobile node, one
obtains a complete (albeit simulated) picture of the process involved. The source file for aaasimul,
aaasimul.c, was used as the basis for the implementation in the project.
3.6 Building an AAA Prototype
The actual implementation of the project begun by focusing attention on aaasimul.c. The aim
here was twofold:
• Firstly, to separate the role of foreign agent and local authority from that of the home agent
and the home authority.
• Secondly, to enable the home agent to actually create a tunnel to the mobile node rather
than simply sending a reply simulating the creation of the tunnel (as is done with aaasimul).
Doing this facilitated building an AAA prototype independently of the Dynamics implemen-
tation. The prototype so built would, in turn, form the basis for extending the functionality of
Dynamics. The source files written for the purpose of building the prototype are aaa_fa.c and
aaa_ha.c for the foreign domain and home domain, respectively.
aaasimul.c consists of two functions, send_agent_adv() and reply_msg(), besides main().
send_agent_adv() broadcasts agent advertisements to notify any mobile nodes of the foreign
agent’s presence. This function was placed in aaa_fa.c to maintain the same purpose. The extra
functionality provided in aaa_fa.c is acting as a router between the mobile node and the home
agent. Essentially, this entails forwarding all packets from the mobile node to the home agent and
vice versa. The code to do this is shown below:
/* forward message to aaa_ha */







res = sendto(udp_sock2, buf, len, 0,
(struct sockaddr *) &to, tolen);
replylen = recvfrom(udp_sock2, buf2, BUFSIZE, 0,
(struct sockaddr *) &to, &tolen);
sendto(udp_sock, buf2, replylen, 0,
(struct sockaddr *) &from, fromlen);
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In the implementation of aaasimul.c, udp_sock and from define the file descriptor and socket
structure, respectively, to the mobile node. In addition to these, as shown in the code, aaa_fa.c
defines udp_sock2 and to as the file descriptor and socket structure, respectively, to the home
agent.
The other function in aaasimul.c, reply_msg() was placed in aaa_ha.c. In aaasimul.c,
the purpose of reply_msg() is to generate keys and send a reply to the mobile node simulating
request acceptance. In aaa_ha.c this is extended by actually creating a tunnel between the home
agent and the mobile node. Creating such a tunnel requires the use of a colocated care-of address.
The definition of the function for the creation of a tunnel in aaa_ha.c, create_tunnel(), is given
below:
void create_tunnel(struct bindingentry *binding, struct hashtable *hash)
{
struct in_addr temp_addr, local;
int ok = 1;
memset((char *) &local, 0, sizeof(local));
inet_aton((char *) "192.168.242.1", &local);
memset((char *) &temp_addr, 0, sizeof(temp_addr));
inet_aton((char *) "192.168.240.2", &temp_addr);
if(tunnel_fetch(hash, temp_addr, TUNNEL_IPIP, 0) == NULL){
inet_aton((char *) "192.168.242.2", &binding[0].mn_addr);
inet_aton((char *) "192.168.240.2", &binding[0].lower_addr);
if(ok && (tunnel_add(hash, binding[0].lower_addr, binding[0].tun_dev,









The function first checks whether there is an existing tunnel for the given binding and hash.
This is done via the call to tunnel_fetch(), a function defined in tunnel.c, which is part of the
Dynamics package. If there is an existing tunnel, no further action is taken. If there is no tunnel,
one is created with the call to tunnel_add() which is also defined in tunnel.c. If the tunnel is
successfully created, dyn_ip_route_replace() is called to update the host’s routing table with
the route to the mobile node via the tunnel.
To summarise, a prototype was built to which a mobile node could make a request for reg-
istration using AAA extensions. With this prototype, a successful reply would be sent to the
registration. In addition, a tunnel to the mobile node would be set up.
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Figure 3.3: The interactions within the project implementation.
3.7 Integrating the Prototype with Dynamics Mobile IP
Having completed building the AAA prototype with aaa_fa.c and aaa_ha.c, the next step was
to incorporate the functionality provided into the foreign agent and home agent modules.
The interactions within the project’s implementation are shown in Figure 3.3. The fig-
ure depicts the manner in which a registration request with AAA extensions is intended to
be handled. The registration request is first received by a function in fa.c. This function
calls handle_request(), a function defined in fa_request.c. If the request is determined
to contain AAA extensions, it is then to be handled within fa_aaa.c. This is done by call-
ing handle_aaa_request(), a function defined in fa_aaa.c. The request is then forwarded
to the home agent. In a similar fashion, when the home agent determines the function con-
tains AAA extensions, it is forwarded for handling within ha_aaa.c. This is done by calling
handle_aaa_reg_msg(), a function defined in ha_aaa.c. It is worth noting here that the interac-
tion between the functionality in fa_aaa.c and ha_aaa.c, rather than being direct, goes through
ha.c. For the project implementation, this is necessary because it is at ha.c that registration
messages are received.
The source files fa.c, fa_request.c and fa.c are part of the existing Dynamics implemen-
tation. The dotted boxes in the diagram are intended to portray a boundary around the existing
implementation. The source files fa_aaa.c and ha_aaa.c, on the other hand, were defined for
this project. The design of the project is, therefore, that for simple Mobile IP requests – that
is, those that do not require the use of AAA functionality – Dynamics should work as originally
implemented. The implementation of this project is then intended to provide the additional AAA
functionality on top of the existing implementation when such functionality is required. The
details of the implementation are presented in the following sections.
3.8 Modifications to Foreign Agent
It has been noted that a significant difference between RFC 2977, which details AAA requirements
for Mobile IP, and RFC 2002, the original specification of Mobile IP, is the requirement that a
mobile node have a security association with the home authority rather than the home agent. In
the Dynamics implementation therefore, when validating a request from a mobile node, the first
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check carried out the foreign agent is whether a mobile-home authentication extension is included.
This is done with the following code in the function validate_request() found in fa_request.c:
if (ext->mh_auth == NULL) {
error_text = "no mh_auth";
error_code = REGREP_BAD_REQUEST_FA;
}
If the mobile-home authentication extension is missing, a reply is sent to the mobile node
informing it that its request has been rejected. The error code REGREP_BAD_REQUEST_FA in the
Dynamics implementation corresponds to the reply code of 70, which is defined in the Mobile IP
standard as a registration rejection by a foreign agent due to a “poorly formed Request”. In the
project implementation therefore, this situation was handled by checking the registration request
for the presence of AAA extensions prior to the calling of the validate_request(). The function
handle_request() (also defined in fa_request.c) calls validate_request() as follows:
if (validate_request(ext, info))
return 1;
For the purpose of handling requests with AAA extensions that validate_request() cannot
handle, the code that follows was placed before the if statement above:







The purpose of the code in the snippet above is to check for the case of a registration request
that has AAA authentication extensions but not a mobile-home agent authentication extension.
Registration requests that satisfy these criteria are passed to the function handle_aaa_request(),
which is described shortly. The call to this function effectively bypasses the rest of the functionality
in handle_request().
3.8.1 handle aaa request()
The function handle_aaa_request() is defined in fa_aaa.c one of the project source files. Its
role is to forward all registration requests with AAA requests to the home authority. The function
first copies the registration request and the authentication extensions as shown in the following
code snippet:
/* copy the MAC protected area directly from the received message */
auth_ext = (char *) ext->mn_aaa_auth;
auth_len = GET_GEN_AUTH_EXT_LEN(ext->mn_aaa_auth);
...
len = (__u8 *) auth_ext - (__u8 *) ext->req + auth_len;





The difference between auth_ext and ext->req in the calculation of len above gives the
length of registration request alone. auth_len stores the length of the MN-AAA authentication
extensions as calculated by GET_GEN_AUTH_EXT_LEN, a macro defined in message.h. The variable
len therefore stores the total length of the registration request and the authentication extensions.
This value is used to copy the request and the authentication extensions into msg as shown above
in the call to memcpy().
The registration request is then checked to determine if it contains a challenge with the following
code:
if (ext->challenge != NULL && (char *) ext->challenge >= copy_end) {
int n = GET_CHALLENGE_EXT_LEN(ext->challenge);
if (len + n > MAXMSG)
return 1;
memcpy(msg + len, ext->challenge, n);
len += n;
DEBUG(DEBUG_FLAG, " * adding Challenge ext (len=%i)\n", n);
}
The variable copy_end in the if statement is used simply to check that the challenge comes
after the authentication extension as required by the standard that specifies it. The macro
GET_CHALLENGE_EXT_LEN, also defined in message.h, is used to determine the length of the chal-
lenge. The essential point of all this is to add the challenge extension to msg as well.
The steps followed so far in the function with regard to copying the registration message into
msg are drawn directly from aaasimul.c. The extra functionality in fa_aaa.c is relaying the
request to the home authority and relaying the reply from the home agent to the mobile node.




sent = sendto(udp_sock_aaah, msg, len, 0,
(struct sockaddr *) &to_aaah, to_aaah_len);
...
replylen = recvfrom(udp_sock_aaah, buf, BUFSIZE, 0,
(struct sockaddr *) &to_aaah, &to_aaah_len);
sent = sendto(info->iface->udp_sock, buf, replylen, 0,
(struct sockaddr *) &info->src, sizeof(info->src));
Essentially, the request stored in msg is forwarded to the home authority at the IP address
contained in to_aaah via the socket udp_sock_aaah. The reply is received and stored in buf.
This reply is forwarded to the mobile node at the IP address in info->src via the socket
info->iface->udp_sock.
3.9 Modifications to Home Agent
The Dynamics implementation of the home agent, like that of the foreign agent, validates all
registration requests from a mobile node. Once again, the home agent first verifies the pres-
ence of the mobile-home authentication extensions. This is done with a function also named
validate_request() defined in ha.c. The following code shows how this validation is carried
out:
if (ext->req == NULL || ext->mh_auth == NULL) {
LOG2(LOG_WARNING,
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"FA %s: message does not contain either request "
"and/or message authentication\n", faaddrstr);






In this case, the presence of both a request and the authentication extensions is checked. If the
registration request informaton is missing, a reply indicating registration denial by the home agent
on the basis of a “poorly formed request” (reply code 134 in RFC 2002) is sent to the mobile node,
shown as REGREP_BAD_REQUEST_HA in the code. More relevantly, if the authentication extension
is missing, a registration denial with a reply code of 131 for “mobile node failed authentication”
(shown as REGREP_MN_FAILED_AUTH_HA) is sent to the mobile node.
The home agent validates a registration request with the following function call within handle_reg_msg()
defined in ha.c:
mn_spi = validate_request(binding, cli_addr.sin_addr, msg, n, &ext,
&code, &auth_type);
For this project, the following code was added just before the function call above:
if((ext.mn_aaa_auth != NULL) && (ext.mh_auth == NULL)){
handle_aaa_reg_msg(&cli_addr, &ext, binding, bindings, tunnels, &code,
&bindingcount, t_data, config.max_bindings, rsock);
return 0;
}
As was done in the foreign agent, the message is first checked to determine if it has MN-AAA
authentication extensions and does not have a mobile-home authentication extension. Messages
that do not satisfy these criteria are handled as usual by Dynamics. However, those messages that
satisfy the criteria are handled by handle_aaa_reg_msg(), which is defined in ha_aaa.c.
3.9.1 handle aaa reg msg()
The function handle_aaa_reg_msg(), like reply_msg() in aaa_ha.c, is responsible for generating
keys, creating a tunnel to the mobile node and sending a registration reply to the mobile node.
As part of its integration with the Dynamics implementation, it also adds an entry for the mobile
node to the table of bindings maintained by the home agent.
The following code snippet demonstrates the generation of the MN-HA key within handle_aaa_reg_msg():
mn_spi.shared_secret_len = MAXSHAREDSECRETLEN;





(unsigned char *) (keymat + 1), KEYMAT_LEN,
nodeaddr, nodeaddrlen,
mn_spi.shared_secret, &mn_spi.shared_secret_len)) {
printf("MN-HA key generation failed\n");
return;
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The significant point about the code shown is the use of the variable mn_spi. This variable
is important because it is will be needed in the process of creating a binding for the mobile node
with the home agent, as will be detailed later. The code above shows that MN-HA key generated
is stored in mn_spi.shared_secret.
A binding is then created by calling create_binding() as shown below:
binding = create_binding(ext, &mn_spi, bindings, tunnels, bcount,
max_bindings, 1);
If successful, the call creates a tunnel to the mobile node and a binding entry based on the
information passed to it in ext and mn_spi. It returns a pointer to the binding entry created.
The function create_binding is discussed in greater detail later.
Bindings have a specified lifetime. This information is added to the binding entry within
handle_request() with the following code:
binding->mod_time = time(NULL);
binding->timeout = MIN(ntohs(ext->req->lifetime), mn_spi.max_lifetime);
binding->exp_time = time(NULL) + binding->timeout;
The time of the most recent modification to the binding, mod_time, is set to the current
time. (The creation time of a binding is also recorded in a binding entry. This, however, is set
in create_binding().) timeout is set to the lesser of the lifetime specified in the registration
request and the maximum lifetime specified in mn_spi. The time of the expiry of the binding,
exp_time, is therefore set to be that of timeout added to the current time. If a binding entry is
added to the binding table without these values being set, the entry (along with the associated
tunnel) will be deleted when the table is subsequently checked for expired bindings.
tunnel_data = (struct ha_tunnel_data *) binding->data;
tunnel_data->reverse_tunnel = (ext->req->opts & REGREQ_REVERSE_TUNNEL) != 0;
tunnel_data->encapsulation = ENCAPS_IPIP;
The information on the source of a registration request is stored as shown:
tunnel_data->lower_saddr.s_addr = cli_addr->sin_addr.s_addr;
binding->lower_port = cli_addr->sin_port;
tunnel_data->lower_saddr.s_addr contains the IP address from which the registration was
received while binding->lower_port contains the port number.
Once the binding entry has all the information required, it is added to the binding table as
follows:
binding_add(bindings, binding);
The function binding_add() is defined in bindings.c, one of the Dynamics source files. In
the function call, bindings is the binding table to which the entry binding is added.
The final step is to send a reply informing the mobile node that its registration request has








The function create_binding() is used to create a binding entry and a tunnel to the mobile node.
Before a binding entry is created, the function checks whether the maximum number of bindings
for the home agent has been reached. This is done with the following code:




b_count points to the number of bindings in the home agent’s binding table. If the maximum
number of bindings, max_bindings has been reached, no more bindings are created. On the other
hand, if the maximum number of bindings has not been reached then memory is allocated for the
binding as shown:
binding = malloc(sizeof(struct bindingentry));
...
memset(binding, 0, sizeof(struct bindingentry));
binding->data = malloc(sizeof(struct ha_tunnel_data));
...
memset(binding->data, 0, sizeof(struct ha_tunnel_data));
t_data = (struct ha_tunnel_data *) binding->data;
The data element of the bindingentry structure is a pointer to an unspecified type (void *).
For the purposes of the home agent, the type is struct ha_tunnel_data, which contains infor-
mation about the tunnel as was detailed in the description of handle_aaa_reg_msg().
The SPI value stored in the binding is determined from the argument mn_spi, to create_binding():
binding->spi = mn_spi->spi;
The IP address information maintained in the binding is set as follows:
inet_aton((char *) "192.168.242.2", &binding->mn_addr);
binding->ha_addr.s_addr = ext->req->ha_addr.s_addr;
binding->lower_addr.s_addr = ext->req->co_addr.s_addr;
It is important to note that in the case of the project implementation, the home agent address is
determined from the registration request. This is shown by the assignment to binding->ha_addr.s_addr
in the code. Ideally, with AAA, this should not be necessary. For the purposes of the project
implementation, this simplified routing the registration request. Nevertheless, it is reasonable that
the mobile node would know the address of its home agent.
The id of a binding is determined from the registration request as follows:
memcpy(&binding->id, ext->req->id, REG_REQ_ID_LEN);
The time of the binding’s creation is also recorded:
binding->create_time = time(NULL);
The actual creation of a tunnel to the mobile node is done with the following call to tunnel_add():
if (ok && create_tunnels &&
tunnel_add(tunnels, binding->lower_addr, binding->tun_dev,
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ext->req->ha_addr, 1, TUNNEL_IPIP, 0) == NULL) {
printf("Could not add tunnel to FA %s (COA=%s) for "




The destination address of the tunnel is binding->lower_addr, the mobile node’s care-of address.
The local address is the address of the home agent, ext->req->ha_addr. The tunnel created is
added to tunnels, which maintains information on all the tunnels that are in use by Dynamics.
In this project, only IP-in-IP encapsulation (shown in the code as TUNNEL_IPIP) is used. This is
the encapsulation mode that is required by the Mobile IP standard.
If the tunnel is successfully created, the following call to dyn_ip_route_get(), a function
defined in dyn_ip.c is made:
if (ok && create_tunnels &&
dyn_ip_route_get(binding->mn_addr, t_data->arp_if, IFNAMSIZ)
!= 0) {




The point of this call is to determine the correct interface for the mobile node’s home address.
The correct interface is stored in t_data->arp_if. As will be shown later, this is done to use
proxy and gratuitous ARP as specified in the Mobile IP standard.
Upon the success of this, a call to dyn_ip_route_replace() is then made as was done with
the AAA prototype:
if (ok && create_tunnels &&
dyn_ip_route_replace(binding->mn_addr, binding->tun_dev) != 0) {




The purpose of this is to update the routing table of the home agent so that all IP traffic
destined to mobile node’s home address (as given by binding->mn_addr) is directed to the tunnel
device, binding->tun_dev.
If any of the tunnel creation or route updating steps fail as shown by setting ok to FALSE in the
preceding code snippets, the memory allocated for the binding is de-allocated with create_binding()






On the other hand, if the tunnel creation and route updating steps are successful, the next
step is to fulfill the Proxy and Gratuitous ARP requirements of Mobile IP. According to RFC
2002, these mechanisms are used to “attract and intercept any datagrams destined to the home
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Using Proxy ARP, the home agent sends ARP replies on behalf of the mobile node when it is
in a foreign network. This way the nodes making the ARP requests associate the home agent’s
link layer address with the mobile node’s IP address. The call to proxyarp_add_item() in the
preceding code snippet adds the mobile node’s IP address to the cache of addresses on whose behalf
the home agent sends ARP replies. With Gratuitous ARP, the home agent sends an unsolicited
ARP packet to cause nodes that receive the packet to update their own ARP caches so that they
associate the mobile node’s IP address with the home agent’s link layer address. It is to this end
that the call to proxyarp_gratuitous() in the code is made.
With all the preceding steps completed, the number of bindings maintained by the home agent







In this chapter, the results of the implementation are presented. These results are presented in
the form of program output.
The mobile node begins by sending a registration request while in a foreign network as shown:
Registration Request
type 1, opts 22, lifetime 300
home_addr 0.0.0.0, ha_addr 192.168.242.1
co_addr 192.168.240.2, id c71c93eb, 233777e0
mn_nai: type 131, length 14, nai: mn@example.com
mn_keyreq: type 134, length 12, vendor_id 5202, sub_type 5,
spi 0, key len 0
encaps_delivery
MN_FA_KEY_REQ_AAA: type 40, subtype 7, length 4, MN SPI 1000 (0x000003e8), keylen 0
MN_HA_KEY_REQ_AAA: type 42, subtype 7, length 4, MN SPI 1000 (0x000003e8), keylen 0
gen_auth(MN-AAA): type 36, subtype 1, length 24, spi 12345, auth len 20
sending registration request to 192.168.242.1:434, type=1
The registration request shown here is sent directly to the home agent. It can be seen that the
mobile node specifies the address of its home agent but not its home address. It uses the NAI of
mn@example.com. The request also contains AAA key request extensions.
The home agent upon receiving the registration request, generates the keys requested for as
shown:
auth_generate_key: alg=4, secret=aaa-test, keymat_len=8, nodeaddrlen=14
Adding MN-HA auth ext: alg=4 mn_spi.shared_secret=ac21d40... mn_spi.shared_secret_len=16
auth_generate_key: alg=4, secret=aaa-test, keymat_len=8, nodeaddrlen=14
Adding MN-FA auth ext: alg=5 fa_secret=3f5f21... fa_secret_len=16
The home agent then proceeds to make a binding for the mobile node and create a tunnel
directly to it. This is shown in the output that follows:
Creating a new binding for MN
tunnel_add 192.168.240.2, type=1, key=0
dyn_ip_tunnel_add(TUNL0,192.168.240.2,192.168.242.1)
tunnel_add => tun_dev=[TUNL0]
dyn_ip_route_get: 192.168.242.2 => eth0
proxyarp_add_item: ether - name=eth0, HW addr=00:02:b3:1f:32:50
proxyarp_add_item: added proxyarp for 192.168.242.2 to device eth0
proxyarp_gratuitous: sending gratuitous ARP - IPaddr: 192.168.242.2, HWaddr: ..., family=1
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The tunnel is created as shown in the lines containing tunnel_add and dyn_ip_tunnel_add. The
kernel routing table of the host on which the home agent is running is updated to reflect the cre-
ation of the tunnel. In addition, the ARP related mechanisms discussed in the previous chapter
are also carried out.
Once all this is completed, the home agent sends the following registration reply to the mobile
node:
Registration Reply
type 3, code 0, lifetime 300
home_addr 192.168.242.2, ha_addr 192.168.242.1
id c71c93eb, 233777e0
mn_nai: type 131, length 14, nai: mn@example.com
MN_HA_KEY_MATERIAL_AAA: type 43, subtype 1, length 24, lifetime 600, keylen 20
aaa_spi=12345, ha_spi=12346, alg_id=2, replay_method=2
mh_auth: type 32, length 20, spi 1000, auth len 16
MN_FA_KEY_MATERIAL_AAA: type 41, subtype 7, length 22, keylen 22
lifetime=600, aaa_spi=12345, fa_spi=100000, alg_id=3
challenge: type 132, length 4, challenge: 62A9AA7B
mf_auth: type 33, length 24, spi 1000, auth len 20
One item of particular interest is the provision of a home address for the mobile node. The
reply also contains key material generated from the message received from the mobile node.




add_fa_spi: adding dynamic security association (SPI=100000, addr=192.168.242.1)
The mobile node also determines its home address from the registration reply as shown:
Discovered MN home address from reply: 192.168.242.2
Registration accepted
Finally, the mobile node sets up a tunnel to the home agent as shown:
Start tunneling - FA addr 192.168.242.1
Adding tunnel TUNLMNA => 192.168.242.1
Setting default route to TUNLMNA
The output above also shows that the mobile node sets this tunnel as the default route.
At the mobile node, the creation of the tunnel can be verified with the Linux ifconfig com-
mand which gives:
TUNLMNA Link encap:IPIP Tunnel HWaddr
inet addr:192.168.242.2 P-t-P:192.168.242.2 Mask:255.255.255.255
The updating of the routing table, on the other hand, is verifed with the Linux command,
route -n to give:
Kernel IP routing table
Destination Gateway Genmask Flags Metric Ref Use Iface
...
0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 U 0 0 0 TUNLMNA
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The tunnel, shown as TUNLMNA, becomes the default route.
Similarly, the creation of the tunnel at the home agent is verified with the following output:
TUNL0 Link encap:IPIP Tunnel HWaddr
inet addr:192.168.242.1 P-t-P:192.168.242.1 Mask:255.255.255.255
...
The updated routing table at the home agent is as follows:
Kernel IP routing table
Destination Gateway Genmask Flags Metric Ref Use Iface





There remains considerable work that could be done beyond the implementation described in this
report. In this project’s implementation, for instance, tunnels can only be made using colocated
care-of addresses. Future work could extend this so that foreign agent care-of addresses may also
be used.
In addition, because this project describes a prototype, future work could involve a more com-
prehensive implementation that made use of AAA servers as described in RFC 2977. This could
make use of RADIUS servers such as FreeRADIUS, an open-source implementation of RADIUS.
The Diameter protocol is expected to replace RADIUS as the AAA protocol of choice particu-
larly with developments in mobile computing. Future work could therefore incorporate the use of
Diameter for AAA services.
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